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Abstract 
We find significant evidence that academic directors enhance firms’ corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) performance after examining a sample of S&P 1,500 firms for years 2002 to 2011. The 
presence of academic directors in corporate board increases firms’ CSR performance. Within 
academic directors, female academic directors have positive incremental effect on firm’s CSR 
performance. We also find that academic directors’ and female academic directors’ influence on 
CSR activity is not similar across CSR components. Among seven qualitative components of CSR, 
academic directors have significant positive effect on community, diversity, environment and 
product components. At the same time, female academic directors have positive effect on diversity 
and employee relations but negative effect on environment. Finally, we observe that the effect of 
academics on CSR is heterogeneous across their academic specialization and experience. In 
particular, we note that academics with administrative responsibility, business background and 
industry experience have significant positive effect on firms’ CSR performance.      
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1. Introduction 
Recent fraudulent activities and scandals such as Enron, Tyco, Adelphia and WorldCom 
led U.S. legislators and regulators to tighten laws to improve board efficacy by requiring firms to 
appoint independent directors. For instance, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) requires 
corporate boards to be more independent, more transparent. The rule requires majority of the 
corporate board members to be independent. As such, the number of independent directors in 
corporate board is increasing and an increasing number of independent board members are 
coming from academia. Our sample demonstrates almost 70% of the directors of Standard & 
Poor’s (S&P) 1,500 firms are independent directors and more than 45% of S&P 1,500 firms have 
at least one independent director from an academic institutions for years 2002 to 2011. Yet, the 
literature investigating the effect of the presence of academic directors on board on corporate 
strategies and performance remains limited. 
Academic directors bring several unique characteristics to the corporate boards. First, 
academic directors are experts in their own fields which makes them critical thinkers of 
specialized problems (Francis et al., 2015). They analyze the situation in scholarly style by 
viewing it through different angles. Their advising role becomes very important to those firms 
which have significant portion of knowledge based earnings. Second, since academic directors 
have relatively higher level of independence in their academic job, they may carry over that 
character on the corporate boards. Third, since majority of the academic directors come from 
reputed universities, they bring in a strong academic network with them (White et al., 2013). 
Using this network, companies may develop their technology, business strategies, brand and a 
supply of new employees. Alternatively, one can argue that an academic director may not be as 
effective as a non-academic independent director. First, White et al. (2013) point out academic 
directors may have biased opinions as they are often appointed by CEOs or chairpersons of the 
board. CEOs and chairpersons frequently invite academics into corporate board from their alma 
mater. Therefore, they try to reduce board dissent through choosing from a group of acquaintances 
(Hwang et al. 2009). Thus they may not be independent decision makers. Second, their lack of 
business experience may lead them to focus excessively on theoretical solution to a problem 
which may lack practicality in real world scenarios (Francis et al. 2013). Finally, since many 
academic directors share the administrative responsibilities in their academic institutions, they 
may not get sufficient time to contribute to the corporate policies and decision making.      
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In this study, we are particularly interested in how academics on board influence firms’ 
Corporate Social responsibility (CSR). CSR has drawn significant attention in recent years as 
investors, governments, and companies alike are taking this issue more positively arguing that the 
CSR activity is enhancing interest of all stakeholders collectively (Heinkel et al, 2001, Dhaliwal 
et al., 2011, Goss et al., 2011, Albuquerque et al., 2013, Ioannou et al., 2014).1 Numerous studies 
have been conducted from different perspectives to answer whether CSR is value enhancing 
activity or simply a reflection of firms’ agency problems. In a nutshell, value enhancing view says 
company can increase its valuation by improving CSR performance through brand creation, 
community engagement, social awareness program, reducing financial distress, increasing stock 
liquidity and capital constraints ( Heinkel et al., 2001, Lee et al., 2009; Goss, 2009; El Ghoul et 
al., 2011; Dhaliwal et al., 2011; Goss et al., 2011; Hoi et al., 2013; Albuquerque et al., 2013; Deng 
et al., 2013; Cheng et al., 2014; Ioannou et al., 2014; Watson, 2014; Giulia et al., 2014). In 
contradiction, agency view proponents argue that while through CSR activities managers often 
overspend corporate resources and stray away from the ultimate goal of wealth creation for 
shareholders (Jensen, 2001). Managers may also get personal benefits or satisfaction at the 
expense of shareholders (Cheng et al., 2014).   
In the intersection of the literature that focuses on academic directors and the literature 
that focuses on corporate social responsibility (CSR), we ask whether the presence of academic 
directors in corporate boards promote firms’ CSR activity. Do female academics play differential 
role on CSR activity? If they do, which components of CSR score are most affected by the 
presence of academic director or female academic directors? How do specialization and 
experience of academic director affect their influence on company’s CSR activities? 
                                                 
1 Definition of CSR appears to map broad range of activities yet with somehow similar focus. To CSR in perspective, 
Carroll (1998) emphasizes four aspects of corporate citizenship. Based on these four aspects Hill et al. (2007, p. 167) 
summarize corporate social responsibility as “the economic, legal, moral, and philanthropic actions of firms that 
influence the quality of life of relevant stakeholders. Each of these constituencies, both individually and collectively, 
forms opinions about organizations through perceptions of firms' corporate social performance, which is 
characterized as summary judgments about CSR activities used by investors to make purchase decisions.”  The World 
Bank Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) argues "Corporate Social Responsibility is the continuing 
commitment by business to contribute to economic development while improving the quality of life of the workforce 
and their families as well as of the community and society at large." See Corporate Social Responsibility: Meeting 
changing expectations, p. 3. More recently, Robert et al. (2011) argue CSR helps in “maximizing the creation of 
shared value for their owner/stakeholders and for their other stakeholders and society at large”. 
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We first investigate the relationship between academic director in the board and firms’ 
CSR activity. We define the “presence" of academic directors by taking Academic Company 
Dummy variable. A company is identified as “Academic Company” if it appoints at least one 
academic director in its corporate board. Whereas, “percentage” of academic directors is defined 
as the total number of academic directors divide by the total number of directors in a board. We 
argue that the presence of academic director in the board promotes CSR activity. Apart from this, 
we also argue female academics bring diversity to corporate board and may have inclination to 
increase overall diversity of the firm. Using a sample of 12,484 firm-year observations for years 
2002 to 2011 we find that firms with academic directors in corporate boards demonstrate higher 
CSR performance. We also examine how academic directors impact different CSR components 
separately. Among 7 different components, we find that the presence of academic directors have 
positive effect on Community, Diversity, Environment and Product components of CSR. 
Additionally, higher percentage of academic directors increases CSR score in Employee relations, 
Human Rights and Corporate Governance criteria. We also find that female academic directors 
positively affect CSR Diversity and Employee relations components and inversely affect CSR 
Environment component. 
Next we shed light on the impact of characteristics of academic director on a firm’s CSR 
performance. Academic directors often have different skill sets because of their background or 
job responsibility. Thus, we predict that these heterogeneous skill sets might affect their CSR 
preference differently. To test this conjecture, we classify academic director into several 
categories based on their different attributes:  Administrative – academics with administrative 
responsibility, e.g., presidents and deans; STEMM – academics with a background of science, 
technology, engineering, mathematics or medicine; Business – academics with general business 
expertise, e.g., professor of business or law school; 2 Industry Experienced – academics with 
significant industry experience, e.g., an adjunct faculty who has many years of industry 
experience; Research Focused – academics with active in research and development in his/her 
own field of study; Public Service Affiliated – academics with public service related job 
experience, e.g., a professor who serves as a chairman of Federal Reserve Bank. 
Democratic/Republican – academics with affiliation or explicit supports to 
                                                 
2 We follow the definition of White et al., 2013.  
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Democratic/Republican Party, e.g., an academics who runs presidential election as 
Democratic/Republican candidate. We find that academic directors with administrative 
experience within the university and outside the university in business and industry experience 
have greater impact on firm’s CSR score. Also, firms with academic directors affiliated with 
Democratic Party demonstrate higher CSR scores compared to those with academic directors 
affiliated with Republican Party.  
To our knowledge, this is the first study to formally connect the relationship of academic 
director with company’s corporate social responsibility using full sets CSR components. 
However, we noted that in a concurrently conducted research Cho et al. (2015) appear to address 
somehow similar research question. While the basic findings on the effect of academic director 
on CSR appear to be similar, our approach is visibly different from their approach. While Chao 
et al. rely on three components of CSR, we rely on all seven KLD CSR components. Cho et al. 
(2015) study is limited to basic effect of academic director on CSR based on these three 
components, whereas we thoroughly examine if the effect of academic director varies by their 
gender (e.g. female academic directors). We also thoroughly identify several other attributes of 
academic directors (i.e. Industry Experienced, Research Focused, Public Service Affiliated, 
Democratic and Republican) apart from those Cho et al. (2015) identify (i.e. Administrative, 
Specialized and Business). We then assess whether the firms’ CSR performance is contingent on 
academic director attributes. We find that academic directors with administrative skill, business 
and industry experience and Democratic Party affiliation have significantly positive effect on 
firms’ CSR performance.     
The rest of the thesis proceeds as follows: Section 2 explores the relevant literature and 
research questions development. Sections 3 presents the sample data, test and control variables to 
examine our research question. Section 4 discusses the results, followed by the concluding 
remarks in Section 5.      
2. Literature Review and Research Questions Development 
2.1. Literature Review 
In corporate finance literature it is well documented that independent corporate board 
members can discipline managers’ actions and guide a company through monitoring and advising 
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role (Lincka et al., 2008). Francis et al. (2015) investigate whether an academic director exhibits 
similar monitoring and advising role that a non-academic independent director does. They find 
that an academic director can play an important role as a monitor and advisor. Peterson and Philpot 
(2009) discuss several characteristics that academic directors bring to corporate board after 
analyzing US Fortune 500 firms. These include demographic diversity and appointment in public 
affairs committees. They also find that corporations have preference for academics from top US 
universities. Companies also prefer appointing from local universities which are closer to the 
companies’ headquarter.      
In a recent paper, Francis, Hassan and Wu (2015) draw attention to the researchers about 
academic directors’ impact on several aspects of firm performance and corporate governance. 
After analyzing S&P 1500 companies, they conclude that academic directors have positive 
relationship with firm performance measured by Tobin’s Q and return on assets. They find that 
firms with academic directors demonstrate better post acquisition performance, higher level of 
research and development, higher level of information flows into capital market and lower level 
of CEO entrenchment. In addition, they categorize these academic directors into administrative 
academic director (directors with administrative experience) and non-administrative academic 
director and find that non administrative directors are more actively engaged with board decisions.  
In response to Francis et al. (2015) study, White, Woidtke, Black and Schweitzer (2013) 
examine the rationale and the possible channels through which the academic directors get 
appointed in corporate boards. Consistent with Francis et al. (2015), they find academic directors 
with background of science, medicine and engineering get appointment for their technical 
expertise on respective fields while academic directors with business background get appointment 
for their general expertise about business. Market also treats these appointments differently 
favoring the former more positively. Academic administrators from well-known universities get 
appointed because of their “networking effect”. Earlier, Anderson, Mansi and Reeb (2003) find 
that the presence of academic director is inversely associated with cost of debt. They argue that 
the appointment of academics in audit committee make the committee more independent. This 
independence of the committee reduces firms’ cost of issuing debt. Guner, Malmendier and Tate 
(2008) identify business professors as one type of financial experts and find these professors can 
reduce firms’ financing constraint.  
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In contrast with academic director concept, empirical literature is divided into two groups 
in the issue of corporate social responsibility (CSR). An age old debate that Adolf A. Berle Jr. 
and E. Merrick Dodd Jr. started in early 1930s has still no definite answer. Both agency view and 
value enhancing proponents make strong arguments in their favor. Agency view proponents posit 
managers destroy shareholders wealth by using corporate resources in CSR activity. Friedman 
(1970) claims that managers do not hold any responsibility towards society. Their only 
responsibility is to create wealth for the shareholders. This argument is later supported by Jensen 
(2001) who argues CSR activity can create agency problem by distracting managers from their 
value maximization focus. Hillman and Keim (2001) using KLD dataset propose that CSR is 
inversely associated with firm valuation. In a recent paper using the same KLD data, Cheng, Hong 
and Shue (2014) support that managers may benefit themselves from investing in CSR activity. 
Using non-KLD dataset, Bauer et al. (2005), Ronneboog et al. (2008) and Lee et al. (2013) 
determine socially responsible firms suffer from financial market performance.  
On the contrary, value enhancing view presumes that CSR positively affects stakeholders 
by reducing risk, creating brand value, lowering financial distress cost and attracting socially 
aware investor group. Using KLD dataset, El Ghoul, Guedhami, Kwok and Mishra (2011) find 
that firms with high CSR activity enjoy significantly lower cost of equity capital. Dhaliwal, Li, 
Tsang and Yang (2011) identify that lower cost of equity capital can be achieved by voluntary 
disclosure of corporate social responsivity (CSR) activity. Goss and Roberts (2011) detect that 
less social responsible firms pay premium in their cost debt. Albuquerque, Durnev and Koshkinen 
(2013) find that higher CSR active firms exhibit lower systematic risk. Heinkel, Kraus and Zechner 
(2001) find that CSR attracts socially conscious investors towards firms’ securities which creates 
liquidity or increases demand for firms’ securities. Deng, Kang and Low (2013) suggest that firms 
with high CSR scores tend to realize higher post-merger announcement return and higher long 
term stock performance. Lee and Faff (2009) and Goss (2009) manifest that CSR activity reduces 
firm’s financial distress while Cheng, Ioannou and Serafeim (2014) show CSR activity alleviates 
firm’s capital constraints . In recent years, the number of socially aware investors has increased 
substantially (Ioannou et al., 2014). Ioannou and Serafeim (2014) document that investment 
analysts favoured the agency view of CSR in early 1990s. However, the investment community 
positively values firms’ CSR activities and creates less pessimistic report about these firms for 
being more socially aware up until year 2007. Ultimately in subsequent years, they provide 
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optimistic reports about these firms for having high CSR activities. After assessing the 
relationship between firm’s innovation level and CSR activity, Mishra (2015) finds that more 
innovative firms exhibit higher CSR activity after a successful innovation. This post-innovation 
CSR activity increases firm’s valuation. Firms sometimes engage with CSR activity to get tax 
advantage. While Hoi, Wu, and Zhang (2013) and Watson (2014) point out firms may use CSR 
activity to avoid tax burden, and Lanis and Richardson (2015) show that firms with higher level 
of CSR activity have lower likelihood of indulging in tax avoidance. 
While the goal of this study is not to test these two views, we believe that more recent 
literature concurs that CSR has positive effect on a firm valuation. In short, acknowledging the 
possibility of existence of agency problem in fewer companies, our general assumption is CSR 
activity on average enhances stakeholder interests. 
2.2. Research Questions 
We design our research questions based on the above discussed two ideas. First, Francis, 
Hasan and Wu (2015) determine that academic directors increase firm value (measured by 
Tobin’s Q) and firm profitability (measured by return on assets). Due to scarcity of literature 
regarding academic director issue, we have to heavily depend on this paper. Second, several 
studies (Lee et al., 2009; Goss, 2009; El Ghoul et al., 2011; Dhaliwal et al., 2011; Goss et al., 
2011; Hoi et al., 2013; Albuquerque et al., 2013; Deng et al., 2013; Cheng et al., 2014; Ioannou 
et al., 2014; Watson, 2014; Giulia et al., 2014; Mishra, 2015) show that CSR activity positively 
affects firms’ market and accounting performance.  
In summary, we understand from the literature that the presence of academic directors 
positively affects firms’ value, and so does firms’ CSR activity. Then one may argue that one of 
the channels through which academic directors likely enhance firm value is their choice of higher 
CSR activity. If this is the case, we will observe that firms with academic directors will have 
superior CSR performance.  In other words, we argue that academics in the board may enhance 
firms’ CSR performance. Thus we ask, 
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RQ 1: Does the presence of academic directors positively affect firms’ CSR activity? If 
so, does it do so by positively (negatively) affecting CSR strengths (concerns)? 
To understand the next question, we first discuss the CSR components and how academic 
directors affect these components. CSR rating is calculated based on seven KLD-CSR qualitative 
criteria which are Community, Diversity, Employee relations, Environment, Human Rights, 
Product and Corporate Governance. KLD tracks firms’ actions during a given year regarding 
each criterion and assigns a value of 1 in Strengths (Concerns) if the corporate actions show 
positive (negative) confirmatory with respect to each criterion. If KLD does not find any corporate 
action in line with the corresponding criterion, then it assigns a value of 0 to that criterion.   
In this section we discuss how academic directors may influence each criterion. First, one 
of the measures of Community criterion is Support for Education which is a program of educating 
staffs and providing job training. Academic directors promote this kind of campaign and it is often 
seen that academics and academic institutions are the supplier of this service to the companies. 
Second, even though Diversity is not a function of academic director, Diversity of corporate board 
is directly linked up if the board director is a female. Thus, the appointment of a female academic 
director is expected to increase Diversity criterion as she brings more gender heterogeneity into 
board. Third, as discussed earlier, some academics (mostly administrative and industry 
experienced) have significant experience of handling employee benefits, compensation and 
retirement scheme, hiring and lay off policy, workplace improvement, unionization and other 
administrative tasks. When these academics get appointment in the board they focus on these 
factors. All of these factors enhance Employee relations score. Fourth, being more attached to 
nature as compare to other company executives, most academics often care about sustainable 
environment, energy efficiency, recycling, clean energy, pollution control and so on. Thus, they 
might raise these issues during corporate actions. Fifth, academics sometimes argue in favor of 
indigenous people and labor rights which might increase Human Rights criterion of CSR score. 
For instance, Academics Without Boarders (AWB) is an organization supported by academicians 
from different universities which has a mission to improve quality of life throughout the 
developing world, including improved nutrition, universal primary education, gender equity, 
health, and the environment. Finally, certain group of academics (mostly STEMM and research 
focused) frequently express their opinion on firms R&D activity. This might enhance the Product 
 9 
 
component of CSR score. These are just some of the naive examples of how academic directors 
may impact CSR scoring, while we do not rule out the possibility that academic directors may 
enhance CSR via other potential routes. As such, we predict that academic director may promote 
CSR performance by enhancing community engagement, improving employee benefits, 
increasing concern regarding environment and higher R&D activity. First we identify the 
components of CSR score then ask, which particular components of CSR score do academic 
directors affect significantly? Since each component deals with different aspect of a firm’s CSR 
activity, we expect academic directors may not contribute to each CSR component equally. 
Accordingly, we ask: 
RQ 2: Is the effect of academic directors heterogeneous across CSR components? 
Female portray more compassion as compared to male. It can be argued that companies 
signal other stakeholders that their firms pay attention to women and minorities which gives the 
firms credibility about their corporate citizen image (Bear, Rahman and Post, 2010). Landry, 
Bernardi and Bosco (2014) list companies according to different social awareness rating systems. 
They find that higher percentage of woman directors are associated with more socially aware 
firms. Mesch, Brown, Moore and Hayat (2011) document that female board members are more 
likely to focus on charity and they do it by greater amount as compared to male board members 
even after controlling for empathetic concern factor. Bernardi and Threadgill (2010), Setó-Pamies 
(2013) and Harjoto, Laksmana and Lee (2014) realize that firms can increase CSR activity by 
appointing female directors as they bring diversity into the corporate board. This empathetic 
behavior makes them more caring and more concerned about the social issues around them. 
Female directors have lesser degree of attendance problem and they are more engaged with 
corporate decisions (Adams and Ferreira, 2009). New female board member brings new ideas, 
long-term success, competitive advantage and diverse workforce (Adams and Flynn, 2005). 
Having female director in board conveys message to its potential recruits as “female friendly 
employers” and firms gain positive image among its female employees (Terjesen and Searly and 
Singh, 2009). Companies with higher percentage of female members in board have higher level 
of charitable donations (Williams, 2003). Therefore, we test whether female academic directors 
are more socially aware and we formulate our question,            
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RQ 3: Do female academic directors affect CSR performance differently than male 
academic directors? If so, do they do so by positively (negatively) affecting CSR 
strengths (concerns)? 
Applying similar logic that we use for all academic directors, we expect that female 
academic directors affect different CSR components differently. Therefore, we ask:  
RQ 4: Is the effect of female academic directors heterogeneous across CSR 
components? 
Finally, since academic directors have different backgrounds and job responsibilities, we 
posit that this may influence the firms CSR activity differently. Because of the disparity in their 
training and experience, the focus of academic directors’ effect on CSR performance may vary 
across different group of academics. For instance, while a STEMM (academic with medicine, 
science and technology background) academics might be more focused on firm’s R&D activity, 
a Business (academics with business and law background) academics might be more interested in 
business strategy, employee unionization, compensation package determination and so forth. This 
difference in background and experience may influence strengths and concerns of each CSR 
criterion differently. Pattnaik and Pandey (2014) examine “University Spinoffs” which refers 
commercializing technology based business idea where academic entrepreneurs play the major 
role in the development of the business. This knowledge based business model is highly effective 
in high-tech industry where firms’ asset base is heavily dependent on its intangible asset 
component such as patents or human capital. Additionally, examining corporate board’s 
inclination towards political party Goldman, Rocholl and So (2009) examine the market reaction 
on the appointment of a politically biased individual to corporate board as an independent director. 
They find the market responds favourably to the appointment of a Republican Party supporting 
individual to corporate boards. Giulia and Kostovetsky (2014) focus on company’s political 
standing in line with firms CSR activity. They find that Democratic leaning firms are associated 
with higher CSR activity than Republican leaning firms. These findings suggest that research 
active academicians are valuable to firms’ to broaden their knowledge base and at the same time, 
political affiliation of directors may affect firm valuation. After careful observation, we anticipate 
that not all academic directors affect CSR activity similarly. Academic discipline, focus on 
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academic research, job related training and political affiliation should influence academic 
directors’ decision on CSR activity. Therefore, we question, 
RQ 5: Does the CSR effect of academic directors vary across their other characteristics 
(e.g., administrative experience, academic discipline, business and industry experience, 
research intensity, public service affiliation and political preference)? 
3. Data & Sample 
Our sample covers S&P 500, S&P MidCap 400 and S&P SmallCap 600 firms for years 
2002 to 2011. The list of board directors are collected from Investor Responsibility Research 
Center (IRRC) director database. This database includes all the directors’ primary employment 
information, personal attributes such as age and gender, company information and many other 
relevant information. We identify academic director list from this database. After selecting the 
list of academic director, we manually collect information about their education level, academic 
discipline, employment title in academic institutions during the board appointment, industry 
experience and research activity which match with the appointed company’s core business model, 
political party affiliation and public service job related information. We gather these information 
from various websites including personal website, university or college websites and various 
financial and business related websites.3   
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) data used in this research is from Kinder, Lydenberg 
and Domini’s (KLD) database. We discuss in details about how we calculate CSR score later in 
this section. We use Compustat and Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database for 
firms’ financial data and listing year information. We also classify firms by Fama-French 48 
industry groups. After merging all the datasets we finally obtain 12,484 firm-year observations 
with 2,053 unique firms for the sample period that ranges for years 2002 to 2011. 
                                                 
3 List of websites where most of the data regarding academic director attributes are collected from:  Bloomberg 
Business, NNDB, University websites, personal website, SEC filings, Forbes website, LinkedIn, Patent website, 
People.equilar.com, Morningstar, Zoominfo.com, Wikipedia etc. 
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3.1. Academic Director: 
Francis, Hasan and Wu (2015) first comprehensively classify that academic directors are 
special types of independent director in corporate board. Based on the existing literature on 
independent director, they focus on academic director. They identify the companies’ motivation 
for appointing academic directors into corporate board is bringing specialized expertise and 
diversity into the corporate board. White, Woidtke, Black and Schweitzer (2013) extend this list 
of motivation of appointing director from academia by adding network effect and reputation 
building purpose. Many companies desire to hire scholar from top schools and build up their board 
reputation.    
Combining the definition of academic directors from Francis et al. (2015) and White et al. 
(2013) we categorize academic directors list based on some key characteristics. First, anyone who 
is involved with university or educational institution is identified as an academic director. This is 
the definition that IRRC uses when categorizing directors as “Academic”. It is not necessary to 
have a teaching or research position to be an academic director. Even a CEO of an educational 
service company (such as Educational Testing Service (ETS)) can be considered as an academic 
director. However, the number of individuals in this category is negligible (less than 1%) as 
compared to the total sample size of our academic directors list.  
We also identify the gender of academic directors. Our sample shows that 1 out of 4 
academic directors is a female academic director. Two main variables of focus in our study are 
“academic director” and “female academic director” are computed in two ways. First, Academic 
Company Dummy is classified as any company with at least one academic director on its corporate 
board. Second, Academic Director Ratio is the ratio of the number of academic director to the 
total number of directors. We anticipate the coefficients of these variables to be positive. 
Similarly, Female Academic Director Dummy is a dummy variable if the academic director is also 
a female and Female Academic Director Ratio is the ratio of the number of female academic 
director to the total number of directors.   
 Our academic director sample includes university presidents, chancellors, deans of 
different schools, trustees of universities, tenured track professors, clinical professors, professors 
in practice, directors of different institutes, adjunct professors, department chairs, provosts, vice 
presidents and other academics. Second, we classify these academic directors into several 
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categories based on different attributes. We follow the same definition of Francis et al. (2015) for 
Administrative and then extend our academic directors category by adding STEMM, Business, 
Industry Experience, Research Focused, Public Service Affiliated, Democratic and Republican 
definitions.   
[Insert Appendix B1 here] 
Administrative academic directors sit into the leadership positions where their main 
responsibility is to function academic institution or universities smoothly. Titles of these positions 
include president, chancellor, dean, provost, trustee, CEO, chief investment officer, vice president 
and similar title. STEMM academic directors have a background of either science and engineering 
or medical science. Business academic directors have general expertise on business. These include 
academics with both business and law background. Research Focused academic directors are 
active in research and consulting, which is in alignment with the core business model of the 
appointed company. For instance, let’s say Goldman Sachs, which is a large investment bank, 
appoints one academics with background in music and one academic with background in 
corporate law from a local university into its corporate board. Both of them are active in research 
in their respective fields. But in this thesis, we identify the former as “Non-Research” and the 
latter as “Research” academics since the latter’s research and knowledge most likely can 
contribute Goldman’s social and business decision. Industry Experienced academic directors are 
individuals who have at least 5 to 10 years of working experience in the same industry that the 
appointing company operates. For example, let’s say an Air Force General is appointed as 
university president after his service in the air force. S/he has substantial experience about aviation 
system, military strategy, defence and other sophisticated issues. S/he then is invited as a board 
member into Boeing which supplies military fighter plane for US army. Since his/her experience 
is aligned with Boeing’s business model, we classify this academician as industry experienced 
academic director. Public Service Affiliated academic directors have served as government 
officials for substantial period of time during their career. This might be serving as a governor of 
a state, White House official for a term, public attorney position, high officials of judicial system, 
military personnel or similar public service related occupation. Democratic academic directors 
are those who explicitly express their support to Democratic Party and participate Democratic 
presidential campaigns or other elections. In contrast, Republican academic directors are just the 
opposite. For instance, Larry Summer who was the president of Harvard University identifies 
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himself as a Democratic while Glenn Hubbard who is the current dean of Columbia Business 
School recognizes himself as a Republican. Our classification of academic director is not mutually 
exclusive which implies that an academic director can fall into several categories at a time. 
[Insert Appendix B2 and B3 here] 
Around 44% firms in our S&P 1,500 sample have at least one academic director in their 
corporate board. More than 3% firms have multiple academics in board. While the average board 
size in our sample of firm-years is about 9 directors, independence ratio of these boards is 
approximately 70%.  
[Insert Appendix B4 here] 
About 55% of academic directors have at least one administrative role. Majority of these 
groups hold the title of either “President” or “Dean”. University presidents, chancellors or deans 
have substantial amount of leadership experience and qualification. They have a strong network 
with industry and government level. Appointing a director from these pool of individuals gives 
companies access to their networks. Local university graduates can also be a good source of fresh 
employees for companies which contributes to the regional economy (Bramwell et al., 2008). 
Invitation of a top official from university will enhance the supply of quality graduates. In 
contrast, about 34% academic directors do not have any significant administrative responsibility. 
Larger part of the responsibilities of these group of academics are teaching, researching, 
consulting, textbook and case study writing.  
[Insert Appendix B5 here] 
In the academic director sample, the majority of the academics (around 40%) are from 
business background. Most of the top universities in the list have reputed business schools. 
Professors with business background often work as consultant with companies to develop 
business strategy for company expansion, improve operational efficiency to minimize cost, 
educate staffs to be more productive and so on. These professors are active in research, write 
textbooks and case studies, comment on business events, offer consulting, deliver public speeches, 
train professionals and the like. Deans of business school often come from the financial and 
business industry with a significant years of experience. The motivation behind appointing these 
deans into corporate board might be to build relationship with business schools. However, White 
et al. (2013) find that appointing this academics with business background does not make a big 
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change in capital market perspective. In other words, investors do not react significantly when a 
business academics comes into board. 
White et al. (2013) suggest that academics with science, medical and engineering 
background are most likely invited into corporate board because of their specialized expertise. 
They also argue that market favourably responds to the appointment news for these cases 
supporting the specialized expertise hypothesis. Some companies also delegate their research to 
academicians. Thus, educational institutions are great places to develop companies’ technologies 
and growth strategies. Some academician in science commercialize their research through 
forming business entity supporting University Spinoff hypothesis. The number of such cases is 
very limited in our sample and confined within certain industries like information technology, 
bio-technology or similar high tech industry. For example, Phillip Sharp who received Nobel 
Prize for Medicine in 1993 was a faculty member at MIT when he founded Biogen in 1978.     
In many cases politically affiliated individuals get linked with academic institutions. In 
our sample, we find a number of governors from different states take university president or 
adjunct professor position after they retire from their government job related duty. In addition, 
professors sometime actively teach and comment on political events. We classify their 
background as political which comprises of around 5% in our sample.            
Data shows academic directors are mostly appointed from reputed universities.4 Our 
sample is consistent with White et al (2013). Top universities such as Harvard, Stanford, MIT, 
Columbia, New York etc. provide the maximum number of academic directors. This is assumable 
as these universities have relatively better research facilities, employ top scholars and have strong 
industry relationship. Many industries are actually build up around these reputed universities. For 
instance, Stanford University is located close to Silicon Valley and a significant number of faculty 
members from this university sit on the board of Silicon Valley based companies.     
We find academic directors attached with neighbouring universities are often invited by 
companies. Almost 50% of the academic directors are chosen from a university which is within 
200 kilometers from the companies’ headquarter. This implies that the majority of the companies 
prefer to select academics from local universities. However, companies may go far for academics 
who are really qualified for that corporate board position. This statistical finding is consistent with 
Francis et al. (2015) and White et al. (2013). Also, 73% of the academics directors have doctorate 
                                                 
4 Not shown here.  
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level of education which includes PhD, JD and MD. Around 18% academics have graduate level 
education such as MBA, MA, MSc or MPhil. The majority of the companies within our sample 
(60% companies) are incorporated in Delaware.     
3.2. Corporate Social Responsibility: 
 Starting from 1991 KLD Research & Analytics, Inc. provides an annual update of the 
environmental, social and governance performance of companies. KLD increases its coverage 
from 1,100 publicly traded firms to 3,000 from the year 2003. Analyzing firms’ actions KLD 
identifies the strengths and concerns of a firm using 7 different Qualitative Screens. These are 
Community, Corporate Governance, Diversity, Employee relations, Environment, Human Rights 
and Product. For strengths (concerns) in each criterion, KLD assigns a value of 1 if the firm shows 
positive (negative) outlook regarding that criterion, otherwise KLD assigns 0. Adding all the 
strengths of each criterion KLD generates total strength value for a firm (CSR_STR_N). Similarly, 
the sum of all the concerns from each criterion gives total concern value for a firm (CSR_CON_N). 
Netting, CSR_STR_N with CSR_CON_N, we obtain a net CSR score (CSR_N).5 We exclude 
Corporate Governance criterion from net CSR score calculation as CSR does not take into 
account conflicts of interest between insiders and shareholders (El Ghoul et al., 2011). In other 
words, Corporate Governance focuses on investors of the firm and their wealth maximization by 
reducing agency problems. However, our goal is to measure CSR towards non-investors (society 
at large; other than investors) of the firm. Nevertheless, our inference remains the same when we 
include Corporate Governance to our CSR definition which is discussed in the robustness section.   
KLD also collects 6 Exclusionary screens which are basically controversial business 
issues. These kind of businesses are related to Alcohol, Gambling, Tobacco, Firearms, Military 
and Nuclear Power. KLD only issues a concern value for these criteria as these do not have any 
positive social impact (no strength value). We exclude this controversial business rating from our 
analysis as this does not fit into our research purpose. 
3.3. Control Variables: 
We closely follow the related literature to select key determinants of CSR activity. All 
control variables are measured one period ahead of firms’ CSR activity. We control our result for 
                                                 
5 See Appendix A for exact definition. 
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industry effect using Fama-French 48 industry classification and time effect. All the dependent 
variables are measured in T+1 period while the independent variables are measured in T period.  
McWilliam and Seigel (2001), Padgett and Galan (2010) and Mishra (2015) find that 
firm’s R&D activities and innovation level have positive association with CSR activity. Thus, we 
include firm’s R&D Intensity as a control variable. We scale R&D Intensity by dividing R&D 
expense by firm’s total assets. We expect that more innovative firms (proxy by R&D intensity) 
will be engaged with more CRS activity.  
Firm Size is one of the important determinants of CSR activity. Larger firms are normally 
followed by greater number of analysts (El Ghoul el al., 2011) and have more resources to engage 
in CSR activity (McWilliam and Seigel, 2001 and Ioannou and Serfeim, 2012). Natural logarithm 
of firm’s total book value asset is a well-accepted proxy of firm size in literature. We expect Firm 
Size to load with a positive sign. In addition, we predict more mature firms will become more 
socially aware over time. Following Mishra (2015), we assume Firm Age to have a positive effect 
on CSR score. We count the number of years since the firm is included in CRSP database to 
estimate for Firm Age.    
 Profitability is another important factor as more profitable firms will engage in more CSR 
score. Campbell (2007) and Ioannou and Serafeim (2012) argue that profitable firms measured 
by return on asset (ROA) have positive impact on CSR activity. Thus we control for ROA and 
expect to have positive impact on CSR activity. We calculate ROA by dividing net income by 
total assets. Capital expenditure (CAPEX) is assumed to be a salient factor for firm’s future 
success. Mishra (2015) argues that CAPEX is positively correlated with firms’ innovation level 
and therefore it has positive affect on CSR score. Thus we expect CAPEX to have positive 
relationship with CSR activity. We standardize CAPEX by dividing firm’s capital expenditure by 
total assets. Literature (e.g., Cheng et al., 2014) suggests that firms with higher level of leverage 
would choose less CSR activity. We compute leverage by dividing total debt by total assets and 
we expect the sign to be negative. We include Advertising Intensity as a control variable measured 
by the ratio of advertising expenditure to total assets. Sarvaes and Tamayo (2013) observe 
corporate social responsibility to be a value enhancing mechanism by creating customer 
awareness. Thus we expect the sign of this variable to be positive. We incorporate Tobin’s Q in 
our analysis to account for the effect of valuation.        
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In summary, it is expected that the firms with higher percentage of academic directors, 
higher percentage of female academic directors, higher Tobin’s Q, lager and more matured, more 
profitable, lower leverage, more innovative, more advertised companies to be related with higher 
level of CSR activity. We winsorize all Compustat variables at the 1 and 99 percentiles to address 
for outlier effect.   
4. Results 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Univariate tests: 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 We compare CSR score between academic company and non-academic company. While 
the mean of CSR score of the academic companies is positive, the mean of that for the non-
academic companies is negative. The difference of the mean of CSR score of these two groups is 
significant at 1% level which suggests strong evidence in favor of positive role of academic 
director in firm’s CSR activity.     
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 From Table 3 we do not find significant strong correlation among the control variables 
and test variables.6  
4.1. The impact of academic directors and female academic directors on board on firm’s CSR 
activity.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 Table 4 describes the relationship between academic directors, female academic directors 
and firms’ corporate social responsibility performance using linear regressions with robust 
standard errors. We include industry and time dummy to control their effect.  
Models 1 & 2:  CSR_STR_NT+1 = α + β Test variableT + θ Control variablesT + Industry & Time Dummy 
+ εT 
                                                 
6 VIF (variance inflation factor) test supports that there is no significant multicollinearity. 
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 Our test variables in the above equitation are Academic Director Dummy, Academic 
Director Ratio, Female Academic Director Dummy, Female Academic Director Ratio, 
Democratic and Republican. Except Republican variable, all the coefficients of these other 
variables are positive and significant. In model 1, the magnitude of the coefficient for Academic 
Company Dummy is about 0.122 indicating that CSR strengths score is about 0.122 higher in the 
subsequent year for firms with academic directors than firm without academic directors holding 
all others constant. The magnitude of the coefficient for Female Academic Director Dummy is 
about 0.360 which is significant at 1% level indicating that CSR score is about 0.360 higher in 
the subsequent year for firms with a female academic director than firm without a female 
academic director. In model 2, the coefficient for Academic Director Ratio is 1.031 which implies 
that one unit increase in Academic Director Ratio causes an increase of 1.031-unit of firm’s CSR 
strengths score in subsequent period. The coefficient is significant in 1% level. The coefficient 
for Female Academic Director Ratio is about 2.417 which is significant at 1% level indicating 
that one unit increase in Female Academic Director Ratio causes an increase of 2.417-unit of 
firm’s CSR strengths score in subsequent period. This suggests that the relative number of 
academic directors also matters to firms’ CSR strengths. As compared to Republican academic 
directors, Democratic academic directors enhance CSR strengths. In models 1 and 2, the 
coefficient of Democratic academic director dummy is positive and significant at 1% level. Thus 
we can argue that Democratic academics on average increase CSR strengths. These results 
supports our conjecture that the presence of academic director and female academic director in 
corporate board increases firms’ CSR strengths in subsequent year.   
Models 3 & 4: CSR_CON_NT+1 = α + β Test variableT + θ Control variablesT + Industry & Time 
Dummy + εT 
Models 3 and 4 test with the same specification as models 1 and 2 except for the fact that 
now our dependent variable is CSR_CON_N. In model 3, the magnitude of the coefficient for 
Academic Company Dummy is about -0.101 which is significant at 1% level indicating that CSR 
concerns score is on average about 0.101 lower for firms with academic directors than firm 
without academic directors. Our other test variables are not statistically significant in this model. 
In model 4, the coefficient for Academic Director Ratio is -0.782 which implies that one unit 
increase in Academic Director Ratio causes a decrease of 0.782-unit of firm’s CSR concerns score 
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in subsequent period. The coefficient is significant in 1% level. Thus the presence of Female 
Academic Director, Female Academic Director Ratio, Democratic or Republican does not 
influence the CSR concerns score. The result supports our research question 1 that the presence 
of academic director in corporate board might reduce firms’ CSR concerns in subsequent year.   
Models 5 & 6: CSR_NT+1 = α + β Test variableT + θ Control variablesT + Industry & Time Dummy + εT 
In models 5 and 6, we combine CSR strengths and CSR concerns. We calculate the net 
overall CSR score by subtracting CSR concerns from CSR strengths for each year. The magnitude 
and significance of the coefficients of these two models are similar to the coefficients of models 
1 and 2. In model 5, the magnitude of the coefficient for Academic Company Dummy is about 
0.223 which is higher than the magnitude of this variable from model 1. This strengthens the 
evidence in favor of our research question. The magnitude of the coefficient for Female Academic 
Director Dummy is about 0.322 which is positive and significant at 1% level. This supports our 
research question 3. In model 6, the coefficient for Female Academic Director Ratio is about 2.445 
which is also significant and positive. Similar to the models 1 and 2, Democratic academic 
directors enhance net overall CSR score while Republican academic directors do not. The 
coefficient of Democratic academic director is positive and significant at 1% level as before. 
Above result supports our prediction that the presence of academic director and female academic 
director in corporate board might increase firms’ net overall CSR score in subsequent year.   
As far as our control variables are concerned in models 1, 2, 5 and 6, we find Tobin's Q, 
R&D Intensity, Firm Size, Firm age, ROA, CAPEX and Advertising Intensity have significant and 
positive effect on following year’s CSR strengths and net overall CSR activity. We also obtain 
negative relationship for Leverage with CSR strength in models 1 and 2. In models 3 and 4, the 
coefficients either switch their sign or get lesser magnitude. Tobin's Q, Firm Size and Firm age 
are positively related to the dependent variables but their magnitudes are lower compared to the 
coefficients of models 1 and 2. ROA and CAPEX are inversely related to CSR concerns suggesting 
that more profitable and innovating firms have lesser CSR problems. R&D Intensity and 
Advertising Intensity do not have any impact on CSR concern. Leverage is negatively related to 
CSR concerns and the magnitude becomes lesser as compared to models 1 and 2 which suggest 
that higher level of debt negatively affect CSR concerns in lower scale.   
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Thus the above discussion supports our research question 1 and 3. In summary, based on 
evidence we can argue academic directors and female academic directors have positive impact on 
both CSR strengths (CSR_STR_N) and net overall CSR score (CSR_N) but the presence of 
academic directors on board have negative impact on CSR concerns (CSR_CON_N), while female 
academic directors do not have any impact. However, our result regarding political affiliation 
(whether the academic is democrat or republican) may be biased as the sample only includes 23% 
(1,388 director-year observations out of 6,079 academic director-year observations) academic 
directors’ political preference information. Moreover, we could only manage to collect 
information on those academics who explicitly express their political opinion or engage in 
political activity.   
4.2. Is the effect of academic directors or female academic directors heterogeneous across CSR 
components?    
We further test the relationship of academic director, female academic director and 
academic directors’ political affiliation with each component of CSR score. These components 
are Community, Diversity, Employee relations, Environment, Human Rights, Products and 
Corporate Governance.     
CSR_COMPONENTST+1 = α + β Test variableT + θ Control variablesT + Industry & Time Dummy + εT 
 First we examine each criterion by taking the CSR strengths (i.e. for example, 
COM_STR_N for CSR strengths for Community criterion) and CSR concerns (i.e. COM_CON_N 
for CSR concerns for Community criterion) separately as the dependent variable. Then we test 
overall net CSR score for each criterion (COM_N for net overall CSR score for Community 
criterion). The test variables and other control variables for these models are the same as Table 4. 
We examine each criterion following the same procedure.  
[Insert Table 5a here] 
Panel A of Table 5a shows that academic directors and female academic director do not 
have any influence on CSR Community strengths (models 1 and 2). However, both Democratic 
and Republican academic directors have positive and significant influence on CSR Community 
strengths. In models 3 and 4, academic directors negatively impact CSR Community concerns 
which indicates that academics are concerned about the community problems and they try to 
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reduce these issues. Surprisingly, female academic directors enhance CSR Community concerns. 
Academic directors’ political affiliation do not play any role in CSR Community concerns. In 
models 5 and 6, the net overall CSR Community score is only influenced by the presence of 
academic director. Female academic director do not enhance net overall CSR Community score. 
In the overall CSR regression, only Democratic academic directors enhance net overall CSR 
score. 
When a female academic director comes to a board, it directly increases the Diversity 
strengths or vice versa. In panel B from models 1 to 4, female academic directors positively affect 
CSR Diversity strengths and negatively affect CSR Diversity concerns. The magnitude is 
economically meaningful and significant at 1% level. The result is expected as the Diversity is a 
function of female director. However, academic directors inversely affect CSR Diversity concerns 
(models 3 and 4). In models 5 and 6, we find that the presence of academic director increases net 
overall CSR Diversity score. Democratic Academic directors influence both CSR Diversity 
strengths and net overall CSR Diversity score. Republican academic directors do not have any 
impact on CSR Diversity criterion.             
[Insert Table 5b here] 
 In panel A of Table 5b, academic directors have positive influence on CSR Employee 
Relations strengths (models 1 and 2). The coefficients of Academic Director Company Dummy 
and Academic Director Ratio are positive and significant at 1% level. This is logical since a large 
number of academics in our sample are administrative academic directors and they often work on 
employee benefits, compensation package, no-layoff policy etcetera. Thus they tend to focus on 
these issues during their directorship in a company. However, there is no evidence that these 
academics reduces CSR Employee Relations concerns as the coefficient of Academic Director 
Company Dummy and Academic Director Ratio are insignificant (models 3 and 4). In the net 
overall CSR Employee Relations regressions (models 5 and 6), the result holds that higher 
percentage of academics (model 6 only) increases Employee Relations score. On the other hand, 
Female Academic Director Dummy and Female Academic Director Ratio are significant and 
negative in models 3 and 4. This suggests female academic directors focus more on CSR 
Employee Relations concerns and they try to mitigate the problems related to employee. In models 
5 and 6, Female academics positively affect net overall CSR Employee Relations score. 
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Interestingly, Democratic academic directors enhance CSR Employee Relations concerns 
(models 3 and 4). In models 5 and 6, we find Democratic academic directors inversely affect the 
net overall CSR Employee Relations score.   
 In panel B of Table 5b we explore the Environment criterion. We find no impact of the 
presence of academic director or female academic director on CSR Environment strengths 
(models 1 and 2). But in models 3 and 4, we find that the presence of academic director reduces 
CSR Environment concerns. We find that female academic directors boost CSR Environment 
concerns. Democratic academic directors enhance CSR Environment score, Republican academic 
directors do the opposite. This is what is expected as Democrats more often focus on 
environmental issues than the Republicans do (models 1 to 6).7  
[Insert Table 5c here] 
 In panel A of Table 5c, we find no significant effect of academic directors or female 
academic director on Human Rights criterion (models 1 to 6). The political affiliation also does 
not play any role on Human Rights criterion either. This can be justified as most of the scoring 
criteria of Human Rights are related to international events and most often these academics have 
very little control over these issues.  
 In panel B of Table 5c, we can draw a concrete answer whether Academic directors 
enhance CSR strengths or CSR concerns (models 1 to 4). However, in net overall CSR Product 
regression (models 5 and 6), academic directors enhance net overall CSR score. Since we find no 
consistent result in this case, we are not sure which one (strengths or concerns) is the reason for 
the significance of this net overall CSR score. In contrast, female academic directors increase 
both CSR Product strengths and CSR Product concerns (models 1 to 4). But in the overall net 
CSR Product score, Female academic directors are not effective as the coefficients of Female 
Academic Director Dummy and Female Academic Director Ratio are not significant (models 5 
and 6). Democratic academic directors inversely impact CSR Product strengths and net overall 
CSR score (models 1 to 6). Republican academic directors do not have any impact (models 1 to 
6).    
                                                 
7 “Many More Democrats Than Republicans Say Protecting Environment a Top Priority” Pew Research Center, 
February 5, 2013. 
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[Insert Table 5d here] 
 In panel A of Table 5d we find neither academic director nor female academic director is 
significant (models 1 and 2). This indicates that they do not affect corporate governance within a 
company. However, academic directors reduce corporate governance concerns, while female 
academic directors have no significant effect on it (models 3 and 4). The coefficient of Academic 
Director of these regressions are negative and significant at 1% which shows that academics often 
put emphasis to overcome corporate governance challenges. Democratic academic directors boost 
CSR Corporate Governance strengths and CSR Corporate Governance concerns (models 1 to 4). 
But overall, they do not have significant impact (models 5 and 6). Republican academic directors 
do not have a significant impact on Corporate Governance (models 1 to 6).           
To sum up, we test each criterion separately with respect to the presence of academic 
directors, female academic directors and their political affiliation. We find that academic directors 
increase Employee Relations strengths and decrease Community, Diversity, Environment & 
Corporate Governance concerns. Conversely, female academic director reduce Employee 
Relations concerns and increase Environment concerns. Decisively, female academic directors 
increase Diversity strengths and reduce Diversity concerns. Finally, Democratic academic 
directors enhance Community, Diversity & Environment strengths and increase Employee 
Relations & Product concerns. In contrast, Republican academic directors increase Environment 
concerns. Therefore, we find evidence that academic directors, female academic directors and 
their political affiliation affect each CSR components differently which supports our research 
questions 2 and 4.   
4.3. Does the CSR effect of academic directors vary across their other characteristics?  
In this section, we categorize academic directors based on their experience and expertise. 
Based on different attributes we create dummy variables for each category and these categories 
are not mutually exclusive. This entails one particular academic director can fall into different 
categories.  
[Insert Table 6a here] 
In panel A we first define academic directors as either administrative or non-
administrative. In model 1, the coefficient Administrative is positive and significant. The result 
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seems logical as administrative academic directors usually focus on employee benefits, working 
environment, educational support, unionization, compensation package and similar matters as 
they often deal with these matters in academic institutions. All these matters affect CSR strengths. 
In model 2, the coefficient Administrative is negative and significant. This indicates 
administrative academic directors also reduce CSR concerns score. Overall, they generally 
increase CSR net score when they get appointed to the corporate board (model 3).  
Next, in panel B we classify academic director as either specialized or non-specialized. 
We define specialized as anyone with a background in Science (S), Technology (T), Engineering 
(E), Mathematics (M) and Medicine (M) – in short STEMM. In model 1, STEMM academic 
directors positively affect CSR strengths. But they do not have significant effect on CSR concerns 
(model 2). Overall, the effect of STEMM academic directors on net overall CSR score (model 3) 
is insignificant.  
Then, in panel C we test business academics and non-business academics. A significant 
number of academic directors are from business background. They often have significant industry 
experience (50% correlation between Business & Industry Experienced). When these academics 
step into board they mostly focus on profitability, compensation package, employee retirement 
benefits, legal concerns, safer workplace and other factors. CSR score tracks these matters. Thus, 
we expect Business academics may improve CSR scores through these mechanisms. The result 
shows that they have no significant effect on CSR strengths (model 1) but significant negative 
effect on CSR concerns (model 2). Overall, Business academic directors have positive influence 
on net overall CSR score.  
Similarly in panel D, Industry Experienced academics have significant knowledge about 
the appointed company. They work for strategy development, sustainable growth, tax concerns, 
board structure development, employee involvement and familiar issues. We expect that these 
academics might affect CSR score through these actions. We find positive significant relationship 
of the presence of industry experienced academics with CSR strengths. But they do not 
significantly affect CSR concerns. Overall, Business academic directors increase net overall CSR 
score.  
Now in panel E, we explore the issue of research academics and non-research academics. 
Our prediction is that the research focused academics might impact companies’ R&D activities. 
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Unfortunately, we find no significant impact of Research Focused academics on either CSR 
strengths or CSR concerns or net overall CSR score. In panel F, we focus on public service 
affiliated academics. We find Public Service Affiliated academic directors have a positive and 
significant influence on both CSR strengths, CSR concerns and net overall CSR score.  
[Insert Table 6b here] 
Finally, we put all our academic director categories to run horse race regressions. Since 
we find high significant positive relationship between Business and Industry Experienced 
academics (more than 50% correlation)8, we separately examine these two variables to avoid 
possible multi-collinearity problem. In models 1 to 3, we find Administrative and Business 
academics have positive significant relationship with net overall CSR scores. From models 4 to 
6, we find Administrative, and Industry Experienced academics have positive significant 
relationship with net overall CSR scores. In combination to these models, we argue that the 
appointment of Administrative, Business or Industry Experienced academics might affect net 
overall CSR scores in the subsequent year.  
In short, we find evidence in support of the research question 5 where we predict 
academics with heterogeneous educational background and job experience will have different 
level of effect on CSR activity. In particular we find Administrative, Business and Industry 
Experienced academics have greater influence on CSR score.         
5. Robustness  
5.1. Endogeneity issue 
One might argue that more ethical academicians may not choose socially irresponsible 
firms as it contradicts their ideology. This possibility of not involving with socially irresponsible 
firms may bias our results. To address this causality issue we define our dependent variable in 
T+1 period, while the independent variables are measured in T period. This lead-lag relation 
might address reverse causality issue to some extent. Due to data limitation, we are not able to 
use instrumental variable regressions as we could not line up an instrument that we could 
comfortably consider exogenous in this case.  
                                                 
8 Not shown here. 
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5.2. Financial & Utility firms 
KLD rates company’s actions beyond the regulatory rules and requirement. Thus, these 
actions are voluntarily taken by the companies and KLD only takes these actions into 
consideration for its rating purposes. Therefore, the rating should be unaffected by particular 
industry effect. However, to be consistent with the literature, in this section we run Table 4 again 
after excluding financial and utility firms.  In these tests our general conclusion remains the same.9 
The sign and significance of the regression coefficients for our key test variables do not change 
very much.      
5.3. Corporate Governance  
Finally, we include Corporate Governance screen into the calculation of net overall CSR 
score (CSR_N), CSR strengths (CSR_STR_N) and CSR concerns (CSR_CON_N). We create 
modified version of these variables (Mod-CSR_N for net overall Modified CSR score, Mod-
CSR_STR_N for Modified CSR strengths and Mod-CSR_CON_N for Modified CSR concerns). 
Using these new modified variable we run Table 4 and find the similar result as before.10  
5.4. Sin industry 
In the main results we do not exclude the sin industries from our analysis. In the KLD 
dataset, sin industry is rated as Exclusionary Screens which includes 6 different industries. These 
industries are Alcohol, Gambling, Firearms, Military, Nuclear Power and Tobacco. KLD only 
assigns concerns value to these companies. Following the procedure of Honga et al. (2012) we 
identify these firms in sin industry by using a combination of SIC code and Fama-French 48 
industry code. Alcohol and Tobacco industries are categorized in Fama-French industry code 4 
and 5 respectively. Fama-French industry code 26 includes Firearms and Military screens. SIC 
code 0800-0899, 3760-3769, 3795 and 3480-3489 includes the Mining and Natural resource 
companies. 26 companies out of 2,053 sample companies are within sin industries which account 
for 173 director-year observations. We run our Table 4 excluding all the sin firms. Our results 
remain almost similar to those we find in previous tests.11 
                                                 
9 Not shown here. 
10 Not shown here. 
11 Not shown here. 
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5.5. Data Issue 
 Our dataset has relatively lower number of academic director-year observations in the year 
of 2002 as compared to other years’ observations. Thus, we repeat our main analysis dropping 
the observations of year 2002. The general result holds even after the exclusion of these 
observations.12   
6. Conclusion 
Previous literature identifies academic directors as a special class of independent directors 
who bring in their unique experience and expertise when they join corporate boards. On the other 
hand, recent literature finds corporate social responsibility (CSR) reduces firm’s idiosyncratic 
risk, creates brand value, strengthens corporate citizenship image, increases social awareness, 
reduces cost of capital and increases the firm’s value. In intersection of these two strands of 
literature, we ask whether the presence of academic director or female academic director in 
corporate board promotes CSR performance. After examining 12,484 firm-year observations of 
S&P 1500 firms for years 2002 to 2011 , we find both academic directors and female academic 
directors have positive effect on firm CSR activity. This suggests that the appointment of 
academic directors and female academic directors can be effective mechanism to increase firm’s 
CSR activity. Next, we shed light on the possible components through which academic directors 
and female academic directors can enhance CSR performance. Among 7 components of CSR 
ratings which are Community, Diversity, Employee Relations, Environment, Human Rights, 
Product and Corporate Governance, we find Community, Diversity, Environment and Product 
components of CSR respond positively to the presence of academics into corporate board. We 
also find CSR score regarding Employee Relations, Human Rights and Corporate Governance 
criteria along with Community, Diversity and Environment criteria is increasing in the proportions 
of academics in board. In contrast, female academic directors positively affect Diversity and 
Employee Relations criteria. Surprisingly they negatively impact Environment criterion. 
Democratic academic directors are in general more concerned about Environmental issues than 
                                                 
12 Not shown here. 
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their Republican counterparts. Finally, we find Administrative, Business and Industry 
Experienced academic directors have the most positive impact on the firm’s CSR activity.  
Our findings contribute to the literature by adding a new dimension to academic director 
and corporate social responsibility literature. Considering the percentage of firms that appoint 
directors from academia, we believe that the appointment of academic directors is a new possible 
mechanism for companies to be more socially active. We document that the presence of both 
academic directors and female academic directors enhance CSR performance. We also identify 
that both academic directors and female academic directors affect each CSR component 
differently. Finally, such directors’ academic background and job experience plays a vital role 
when academic directors take their CSR decisions.  
7. Limitation 
IRRC database has several limitations including non-consistent data collection method 
before and after the year 2006. Some of the limitations are raised by White et al. (2013). However, 
we try our level best to clean the dataset as much as possible. First, due to lack of one unique 
identifiable variable we have to first merge our IRRC dataset using ticker. Then after manually 
matching CUSIP, company name and GVKEY we merge IRRC dataset with KLD, 
COMPUSTAT and CRSP dataset. Second, same person is categorized differently in different 
period in IRRC database. For instance, same person ‘X’ is recorded as “academic” in year 2003 
and as “consultant” in year 2004. We consider that person as “academic” throughout his/her 
directorship tenure.   
   We collect academic directors’ attributes from different websites which may have 
incorrect or biased information. It particular when classifying research focused and industry 
experienced academic director we use our judgement. Since non-political person’s political 
opinion is hard to identify we rely upon websites information. In particular, if a person is affiliated 
with a particular party’s political campaign or appointed by any particular party we classify 
him/her to that respective party.  All of these might bias our results even though we try our best 
to be consistent. 
KLD dataset has been criticised for not utilizing all available public information (Aaron 
et al. 2009). In addition, KLD dataset has limited coverage during the 1990s and increase its 
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coverage after year 2002. However, since the sample period is from 2002 to 2011 our results are 
less likely to be affected by these biases.  
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Appendix A 
A.1: Variable Construction 
Variable               Definition  Source  
Panel A. Dependent variables   
COM_STR_N 
COM_ STR_N equals the number of strengths in the KLD Community 
qualitative screen 
KLD CSR 
 
DIV_ STR_N 
DIV_ STR_N equals the number of strengths in the KLD Diversity 
qualitative screen 
KLD CSR 
 
EMP_ STR_N 
 
EMP_ STR_N equals the number of strengths in the KLD Employee 
relations qualitative screen 
KLD CSR 
 
ENV_ STR_N 
ENV_ STR_N equals the number of strengths in the KLD Environment 
qualitative screen 
KLD CSR 
 
HUM_ STR_N 
 
HUM_ STR_N equals the number of strengths in the KLD Human Rights 
qualitative screen 
KLD CSR 
 
PRO_ STR_N 
 
PRO_ STR_N equals the number of strengths in the KLD Product 
qualitative screen 
 
KLD CSR 
 
CSR_STR_N 
 
CSR_STR_N score equals the sum of all the strengths of the Community 
(COM_STR_N), Diversity (DIV_STR_N), Employee relations 
(EMP_STR_N), Environment (ENV_STR_N), Human Rights 
(HUM_STR_N), and Product     (PRO_STR_N) qualitative screens scores 
KLD CSR 
 
COM_CON_N 
COM_ STR_N equals the number of concerns in the KLD Community 
qualitative screen 
KLD CSR 
 
DIV_CON_N 
DIV_ STR_N equals the number of concerns in the KLD Diversity 
qualitative screen 
KLD CSR 
 
EMP_CON_N 
EMP_ STR_N equals the number of concerns in the KLD Employee 
relations qualitative screen 
KLD CSR 
 
ENV_CON_N 
ENV_ STR_N equals the number of concerns in the KLD Environment 
qualitative screen 
KLD CSR 
 
HUM_CON_N 
 
HUM_ STR_N equals the number of concerns in the KLD Human Rights 
qualitative screen 
KLD CSR 
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PRO_CON_N 
 
PRO_ STR_N equals the number of concerns in the KLD Product 
qualitative screen 
 
KLD CSR 
 
CSR_CON_N 
 
CSR_CON_N score equals the sum of all the concerns of the Community 
(COM_CON_N), Diversity (DIV_CON_N), Employee relations 
(EMP_CON_N), Environment (ENV_CON_N), Human Rights 
(HUM_CON_N), and Product (PRO_CON_N) qualitative screens scores 
 
KLD CSR 
 
COM_N 
COM_N equals the number of strengths (COM_STR_N) minus the number 
of concerns (COM_CON_N) in the KLD Community qualitative screen 
KLD CSR 
 
DIV_N 
 
DIV_N equals the number of strengths (DIV _STR_N) minus the number of 
concerns (DIV _CON_N) in the KLD Diversity qualitative screen 
KLD CSR 
 
EMP_N 
 
EMP_N equals the number of strengths (EMP_STR_N) minus the number 
of concerns (EMP_CON_N) in the KLD Employee relations qualitative 
screen 
KLD CSR 
 
ENV_N 
 
ENV_N equals the number of strengths (ENV_STR_N) minus the number 
of concerns (ENV_CON_N) in the KLD Environment qualitative screen 
KLD CSR 
 
HUM_N 
 
HUM_N equals the number of strengths (HUM_STR_N) minus the number 
of concerns (HUM_CON_N) in the KLD Human Rights qualitative screen 
KLD CSR 
 
PRO_N 
 
PRO_N equals the number of strengths (PRO_STR_N) minus the number of 
concerns (PRO_CON_N) in the KLD Product qualitative screen 
 
KLD CSR 
 
CSR_N 
 
CSR_N score equals the sum of the Community (COM_N), Diversity 
(DIV_N), Employee relations (EMP_N), Environment (ENV_N), Human 
Rights (HUM_N), and Product (PRO_N) qualitative screens scores 
KLD 
CSR/Author’s 
Computation 
 
Panel B. Control Variables   
Academic Company 
Dummy 
Company with at least 1 Academic Director in the 
corporate board 
IRRC 
Academic Director 
Ratio 
Percentage of Academic Director appointed in the 
corporate board 
IRRC/Author’s 
Computation 
Female Academic 
Director Dummy 
Dummy 1 for female academic director if the academics 
is also an female; 0 otherwise 
IRRC 
Female Academic 
Director Ratio 
Percentage of Female Academic Director appointed in 
the corporate board 
IRRC/Author’s 
Computation 
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Tobin’s Q 
Firm’s market value to book value ratio. Market value is 
calculated as the book value of asset minus the book 
value of equity plus the market value of equity. Book 
value is the total balance sheet value of asset.    
Compustat/Author’s 
Computation 
R&D Intensity R&D expenditure divided by total assets 
Compustat/Author’s 
Computation 
Firm Size Log of firm’s total assets 
Compustat/Author’s 
Computation 
Firm Age 
Number of years since the firm first appeared in CRSP 
database 
CRSP/Author’s 
Computation 
Return of Assets 
(ROA) 
Net income divided by total assets 
Compustat/Author’s 
Computation 
CAPEX Capital expenditure divided by total assets 
Compustat/Author’s 
Computation 
Leverage 
The book value of short-term debt plus the book value of 
long-term debt divided by total assets 
Compustat/Author’s 
Computation 
Advertising Intensity Advertising expenditure divided by total assets 
Compustat/Author’s 
Computation 
Panel C. Academic Director Characteristics   
Administrative 
Academic Director 
Academic director with an administrative role such as President, 
Chancellor, Dean, Provost, Trustee, Chief Investment Officer, 
Vice President etc. 
Author’s 
Computation 
STEMM Academic 
Director 
Academic director with a background of science, technology, 
engineering, mathematics or medicine. 
Author’s 
Computation 
Business Academic 
Director 
Academic director with a background of business and law. 
Author’s 
Computation 
Research Focused 
Academic Director 
Academic director active in research work in his/her own field 
which matches the business of model of appointed company. 
Author’s 
Computation 
Industry Experienced 
Academic Director 
Academic director with substantial years of industry experience 
which matches the business of model of appointed company. 
Author’s 
Computation 
Public Service 
Affiliated Academic 
Director 
 
Academic director with government and government agency 
related job experience. For instance, governor, mayor, judges, 
White House officials, government secretary, military officials, 
federal reserve officials etc. 
Author’s 
Computation 
Democratic Academic 
Director 
Academic director who directly or indirectly supports Democratic 
Party. 
Author’s 
Computation 
Republican Academic 
Director 
Academic director who directly or indirectly supports Republican 
Party. 
Author’s 
Computation 
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Appendix B 
B.1: Distribution of Categorized Academic Directors 
This table presents distribution of the total 6079 director-year observations for academic directors for years 2002 to 2011. Academic Director is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the 
director is affiliated with any academic institution; otherwise it equals 0. Administrative Academic Director is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the academic director is involved with 
an administrative role within academic institution; otherwise it equals 0. STEMM Academic Director is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the academic director has a background of 
science, technology, engineering, mathematics or medicine; otherwise it equals 0. Business Academic Director is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the academic director has a 
background of business or law; otherwise it equals 0. Research Academic Director is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the academic director is active in research align with appointed 
company’s core business model; otherwise it equals 0. Industry Experienced Academic Director is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the academic director has significant industry 
experience in same industry that the appointed company runs its business; otherwise it equals 0. Public Service Affiliated Academic Director is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the 
academic director is affiliated with any public service job; otherwise it equals 0. Democratic Academic Director is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the academic director supports 
Democratic Party; otherwise it equals 0. Republican Academic Director is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the academic director supports Republican Party; otherwise it equals 0.            
  Fiscal Year 
VARIABLES 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total 
Academic Director 
365 565 610 636 630 639 661 703 657 613 6,079 
6% 9.29% 10.03% 10.46% 10.36% 10.51% 10.87% 11.56% 10.81% 10.08% 100% 
             
Administrative 
Academic Director 
215 316 334 356 357 354 362 384 359 328 3,365 
6.39% 9.39% 9.93% 10.58% 10.61% 10.52% 10.76% 11.41% 10.67% 9.75% 100% 
             
STEMM Academic 
Director 
124 178 199 203 192 193 198 212 198 183 1,880 
6.6% 9.47% 10.59% 10.8% 10.21% 10.27% 10.53% 11.28% 10.53% 9.73% 100% 
             
Business Academic 
Director 
135 240 265 279 289 309 324 346 330 315 2,832 
4.77% 8.47% 9.36% 9.85% 10.2% 10.91% 11.44% 12.22% 11.65% 11.12% 100% 
             
Research Focused 
Academic Professor 
98 162 178 180 177 175 170 189 185 171 1,685 
5.82% 9.61% 10.56% 10.68% 10.5% 10.39% 10.09% 11.22% 10.98% 10.15% 100% 
             
Industry Experienced 
Academic Director 
133 229 263 275 276 290 309 329 316 296 2,716 
4.9% 8.43% 9.68% 10.13% 10.16% 10.68% 11.38% 12.11% 11.63% 10.9% 100% 
             
Public Service 
Affiliated Academic 
Director 
76 102 107 114 113 109 113 126 116 103 1,079 
7.04% 9.45% 9.92% 10.57% 10.47% 10.1% 10.47% 11.68% 10.75% 9.55% 100% 
             
Democratic Academic 
Director 
60 75 79 80 77 82 87 88 83 71 782 
7.67% 9.59% 10.1% 10.23% 9.85% 10.49% 11.13% 11.25% 10.61% 9.08% 100% 
Republican Academic 
Director 
39 58 63 63 65 58 62 69 67 62 606 
6.44% 9.57% 10.4% 10.4% 10.73% 9.57% 10.23% 11.39% 11.06% 10.23% 100% 
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B.2: Number of Appointment of Academic Directors 
This table presents the appointment distribution of academic directors in the corporate board. The 
sample includes 2,053 unique firms for years 2002 to 2011. Percentage is given in the 
parenthesis.  
 
Number of Academic Director in a Board Number of Companies 
1 Academic Director 910 (44%) 
2 Academic Directors 51 (2.5%) 
More than 2 Academic Directors 13 (0.6%) 
  
 
 
B.3: Descriptive Statistics regarding Board Composition 
This table presents descriptive statistics regarding board which includes 12,484 director-year for years 2002 to 2011. Independent Director 
Ratio is the percentage of independent director in the board excluding academic directors. Board Size is the number of directors in the 
corporate board. Duality is a dummy variable which equals 1 if CEO is also the chairman of the board; otherwise it equals 0. Interlocked 
Company is a dummy variable which equals 1 if one of the board member has interlocked directorship; otherwise it equals 0. Director Age is 
the average age of all the directors in the board. Director Tenure is the average tenure of directorship of all the directors in the board. Number 
of Directorship is the average number of directorship of all the directors including current employment in the board. Director Ownership is the 
percentage of ownership of all the directors in the board. Inside Ownership is the percentage of ownership of all the executives in the company.    
 n mean sd min p25 p50 p75 max 
Independent Director Ratio 12484 0.697 0.15 0.00 0.60 0.71 0.82 1.00 
Board Size 12484 9.452 2.51 1.00 8.00 9.00 11.00 34.00 
Duality  12484 0.064 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Interlocked Company 12484 0.022 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Director Age 12484 60.978 4.04 7.88 58.50 61.13 63.56 77.83 
Director Tenure 12482 10.354 3.88 1.00 7.67 9.82 12.50 31.33 
Number of Directorship 12484 1.817 0.54 1.00 1.40 1.75 2.17 4.44 
Director Ownership 12374 0.066 0.107 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.60 
Inside Ownership 12168 0.029 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.36 
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B.4: Classification of Academic Director by Title 
This table presents distribution of academic directors by their job title in academic institutions. The sample includes 
6079 director-year observations for years 2002 to 2011. 
Academic Title   Total Number  Percentage (%) 
Professor   2,057     33.86 
President       1,433     23.59 
Dean    1,062   21.12 
Institute Director   477   7.85 
Others    362     5.96   
Trustee    224        3.69 
Chancellor   221   3.64 
Department Chairman  176   2.90 
Provost     63       1.04 
 
B.5: Background of Academic Director 
This table presents distribution of academic directors by their academic or career background. The sample includes 
6079 director-year observations for years 2002 to 2011. The background is selected based on their highest educational 
degree or career path. In most cases, educational degree match with career path. If it does not match, we take 
whichever is more relevant to corporate board.   
 
Subject     Total Number  Percentage (%) 
Business   2,457        40.42 
Medical/ Public Health  968   15.92   
Science & Engineering  912   15.00 
Social Science   510   8.39 
Law    375       6.17 
Political Science/Politics  338   5.56        
Education   319          5.25  
Others       167          2.75 
Arts    33          0.54 
 42 
 
Appendix C 
C.1: Descriptive Statistics  
This table presents descriptive statistics for firm-year sample which includes firms for years 2002 to 2011. COM_STR_N, 
DIV_STR_N, EMP_STR_N, ENV_STR_N, HUM_STR_N and PRO_STR_N are respectively the strengths of 
Community, Diversity, Employee relations, Environment, Human Rights and Products which are the 6 qualitative screens 
of KLD CSR index. CSR_STR_N is the sum of all the strengths of Community, Diversity, Employee relations, 
Environment, Human Rights and Products. Similarly, COM_CON_N, DIV_CON_N, EMP_CON_N, ENV_CON_N, 
HUM_CON_N and PRO_CON_N represent the concerns of each qualitative screen respectively and CSR_CON_N is the 
sum of all the concerns. CSR_N is the net overall CSR score obtained by subtracting CSR_CON_N from CSR_STR_N 
for each firm. Tobin’s Q is the ratio firm’s market value to book value ratio while market value is calculated as the book 
value of asset minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity and book value is the total balance sheet 
value of asset. Return on Asset (ROA) is calculated as net income divided by total assets. Academic Company Dummy is a 
dummy variable which equals 1 if the company has at least 1 academic director in its corporate board; otherwise it equals 
0. Academic Director Ratio is the percentage of academic director appointed in the corporate board. Female Director is a 
dummy variable which equals 1 if the director is female; otherwise it equals 0. Female Academic Director Dummy is a 
dummy variable which equals 1 if the director is both a female and an academic director; otherwise it equals 0. Female 
Academic Director Ratio is the percentage of female academic director appointed in the corporate board (total number of 
female academic director divided by total number of director in board). Firm Size is calculated as log of firm’s total 
assets. Firm Age is the current number of years in the respective year since the firm first appearance in CRSP database. 
CAPEX is calculated as capital expenditure divided by total assets. Leverage is calculated as the book value of short-term 
debt plus the book value of long-term debt divided by total assets. R&D Intensity is calculated as R&D expenditure 
divided by total assets. Advertising Intensity is calculated as advertising expenditure divided by total assets. All the 
Compustat variables are winsorised at 1st and 99th percentiles.  
 n mean sd min p25 p50 p75 max 
CSR_N 12484 0.051 2.58 -9.00 -1.00 0.00 1.00 18.00 
CSR_STR_N 
CSR_CON_N 
12484 
12484 
1.789 
1.738 
2.67 
1.88 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
1.00 
1.00 
2.00 
2.00 
21.00 
15.00 
COM_N 12484 0.108 0.61 -2.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.00 
DIV_N 12484 0.347 1.50 -3.00 -1.00 0.00 1.00 7.00 
EMP_N 12484 -0.131 0.91 -4.00 -1.00 0.00 0.00 5.00 
ENV_N 12484 0.021 0.91 -5.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.00 
HUM_N 12484 -0.063 0.29 -3.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
PRO_N 12484 -0.232 0.70 -4.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.00 
COM_STR_N 12484 0.216 0.58 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.00 
DIV_STR_N 12484 0.797 1.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 7.00 
EMP_STR_N 12484 0.359 0.70 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 5.00 
ENV_STR_N 12484 0.318 0.79 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.00 
HUM_STR_N 12484 0.012 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
PRO_STR_N 12484 0.088 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.00 
COM_CON_N 12484 0.108 0.34 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.00 
DIV_CON_N 12484 0.449 0.63 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 3.00 
EMP_CON_N 12484 0.489 0.71 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 4.00 
ENV_CON_N 12484 0.297 0.77 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.00 
HUM_CON_N 12484 0.075 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.00 
PRO_CON_N 12484 0.320 0.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.00 
Tobin's Q 11605 1.843 0.99 0.82 1.16 1.50 2.12 6.17 
Return on Asset (ROA) 12382 0.050 0.08 -0.30 0.01 0.05 0.09 0.25 
Academic Company Dummy 12484 0.370 0.48 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Academic Director Ratio 12484 0.047 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.50 
Female Director 12484 0.162 0.37 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Female Academic Director Dummy 12484 0.079 0.27 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Female Academic Director Ratio 12484 0.010 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.29 
Firm Size 12382 7.973 1.64 4.95 6.74 7.80 9.02 12.70 
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Firm Age  12419 25.977 19.41 0 12 20 36 86 
CAPEX 12220 0.043 0.05 0 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.25 
Leverage 12351 0.549 0.22 0.09 0.39 0.55 0.71 0.99 
R&D Intensity 12384 0.023 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.20 
Advertising Intensity 12384 0.010    0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.15 
 
C.2: Mean Comparison of CSR_N 
This table presents the univariate tests on the difference between academic directors and 
non-academic directors with respect to CSR activity. Academic Company Dummy is a 
dummy variable which equal 1 if the company has at least 1 academic director in its 
corporate board in a particular year; otherwise it equals 0. CSR_N is the net overall CSR 
score for firm in a given year.  
  
CSR Score (CSR_N) 
   Mean SD N Difference  TSTAT 
Academic Company Dummy 
0 -0.1803 0.025899 7869 
0.6258*** 12.37 
1 0.4455 0.043454 4615 
Asterisks refer to significance levels: ***p<0.01, **<0.05 and *<0.10.  
 
 
     
 
4
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C.3: Correlation Table of Test Variables with Control Variables   
This following table describes the correlation between different control variables. Academic Company Dummy is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the company has at least 1 academic director 
in its corporate board; otherwise it equals 0. Academic Director Ratio is the percentage of academic director appointed in the corporate board. Female Academic Director Dummy is a dummy 
variable which equals 1 if the director is both a female and an academic director; otherwise it equals 0. Female Academic Director Ratio is the percentage of female academic director appointed in 
the corporate board (total number of female academic director divided by total number of director in board). Democratic Academic Director is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the academic 
director supports Democratic Party; otherwise it equals 0. Republican Academic Director is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the academic director supports Republican Party; otherwise it 
equals 0. Tobin’s Q is the ratio firm’s market value to book value ratio while market value is calculated as the book value of asset minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity 
and book value is the total balance sheet value of asset. R&D Intensity is calculated as R&D expenditure divided by total assets. Firm Size is calculated as log of firm’s total assets. Firm Age is the 
current number of years in the respective year since the firm first appearance in CRSP database. Return on Asset (ROA) is calculated as net income divided by total assets. CAPEX is calculated as 
capital expenditure divided by total assets. Leverage is calculated as the book value of short-term debt plus the book value of long-term debt divided by total assets. Advertising Intensity is 
calculated as advertising expenditure divided by total assets. Female Academic Director Dummy is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the director is both a female and an academic director; 
otherwise it equals 0. Female Academic Director Ratio is the percentage of female academic director appointed in the corporate board (total number of female academic director divided by total 
number of director in board). Asterisks refer to significance levels: ***p<0.01, **<0.05 and *<0.10. 
N = 
12,484 
Academic 
Company 
Dummy 
Academic 
Director 
Ratio 
Female 
Academic 
Director 
Dummy 
Female 
Academic 
Director 
Ratio 
Democratic Republican 
Tobin’s 
Q 
R&D 
Intensity 
Firm Size 
Firm 
Age 
Return on        
Asset 
(ROA) 
CAPEX Leverage 
Advertising 
Intensity 
Academic    
Company 
Dummy 
1              
Academic 
Director Ratio 
0.64*** 1             
Female 
Academic 
Director 
Dummy 
0.38*** 0.24*** 1            
Female 
Academic 
Director Ratio 
0.41*** 0.34*** 0.87*** 1           
Democratic 0.28*** 0.17*** 0.21*** 0.20*** 1          
Republican 0.24*** 0.11*** 0.09*** 0.06*** -0.04*** 1         
Tobin’s Q 0.00 0.00 -0.04*** -0.03** 0.01 -0.03*** 1        
R&D Intensity 0.03** 0.08*** -0.05*** -0.03** -0.01 -0.02* 0.31*** 1       
Firm Size 0.18*** 0.13*** 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.22*** 0.17*** -0.25*** -0.26*** 1      
Firm Age 0.13*** 0.13** 0.13*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.07*** -0.14*** -0.11*** 0.35*** 1     
Return on 
Asset (ROA) 
0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.00 0.50*** -0.05*** -0.08*** 0.01 1    
CAPEX -0.02* -0.03** -0.01 -0.01 -0.03*** 0.03*** 0.10*** -0.09*** -0.11*** 0.02* 0.16*** 1   
Leverage 0.049*** -0.00 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.04*** -0.34*** -0.35*** 0.56*** 0.21*** -0.27*** -0.15*** 1  
Advertising 
Intensity 
-0.02* -0.03** -0.01 -0.01 -0.02* -0.01 0.16*** -0.03*** -0.11*** -0.00 0.11*** 0.09*** -0.07*** 1 
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C.4: Firm's CSR Activity  
This table presents the OLS regression results of the relationship between academic director and female academic director with firm net 
overall CSR score, CSR strengths and CSR concerns. Dependent variable (CSR_N) is measured in T+1 period while the independent 
variables are measured in T period. Thus, the sample size reduces from 12,484 to 9,506 director-year observations for these models. 
Academic Company Dummy is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the company has at least 1 academic director in its corporate board; 
otherwise it equals 0. Academic Director Ratio is the percentage of academic director appointed in the corporate board. Female Academic 
Director Dummy is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the director is both a female and an academic director; otherwise it equals 0. 
Female Academic Director Ratio is the percentage of female academic director appointed in the corporate board (total number of female 
academic director divided by total number of director in board). Democratic Academic Director is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the 
academic director supports Democratic Party; otherwise it equals 0. Republican Academic Director is a dummy variable which equals 1 if 
the academic director supports Republican Party; otherwise it equals 0. Tobin’s Q is the ratio firm’s market value to book value ratio 
while market value is calculated as the book value of asset minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity and book value 
is the total balance sheet value of asset. R&D Intensity is calculated as R&D expenditure divided by total assets. Firm Size is calculated as 
log of firm’s total assets. Firm Age is the current number of years in the respective year since the firm first appearance in CRSP database. 
Return on Asset (ROA) is calculated as net income divided by total assets. CAPEX is calculated as capital expenditure divided by total 
assets. Leverage is calculated as the book value of short-term debt plus the book value of long-term debt divided by total assets. 
Advertising Intensity is calculated as advertising expenditure divided by total assets. All the Compustat variables are winsorised at 1st and 
99th percentiles. Robust T-stats are in brackets and asterisks refer to significance levels: ***p<0.01, **<0.05 and *<0.10. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 CSR_STR_N CSR_STR_N CSR_CON_N CSR_CON_N CSR_N CSR_N 
Academic 
Company Dummy 
0.122** 
(2.34) 
 -0.101*** 
(-2.86) 
 0.223*** 
(3.73) 
 
Academic Director 
Ratio 
 1.031*** 
(3.01) 
 -0.782*** 
(-3.52) 
 1.813*** 
(4.58) 
Female Academic 
Director Dummy 
0.360*** 
(3.49) 
 0.038 
(0.52) 
 0.322*** 
(2.78) 
 
Female Academic 
Director Ratio 
 2.417*** 
(3.08) 
 -0.029 
(-0.05) 
 2.445*** 
(2.69) 
Democratic  0.543*** 0.588*** 0.177* 0.164 0.365** 0.424** 
 (3.53) (3.85) (1.67) (1.56) (2.18) (2.55) 
Republican 0.163 0.216 0.153 0.128 0.010 0.088 
 (1.05) (1.41) (1.26) (1.07) (0.05) (0.47) 
Tobin's Q 0.231*** 0.234*** 0.076*** 0.074*** 0.155*** 0.160*** 
 (8.49) (8.62) (4.04) (3.94) (4.96) (5.13) 
R&D Intensity 10.183*** 10.065*** -0.685 -0.630 10.868*** 10.696*** 
 (14.69) (14.51) (-1.58) (-1.45) (13.22) (12.97) 
Firm Size 1.195*** 1.193*** 0.615*** 0.617*** 0.581*** 0.576*** 
 (51.77) (51.95) (36.44) (36.39) (21.99) (21.90) 
Firm Age 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.003* 0.003* 
 (12.36) (12.24) (12.68) (12.83) (1.88) (1.73) 
Return on Asset 
(ROA) 
1.548*** 
(4.61) 
1.547*** 
(4.62) 
-1.097*** 
(-4.45) 
-1.100*** 
(-4.47) 
2.645*** 
(6.60) 
2.647*** 
(6.63) 
CAPEX 1.837*** 1.824*** -1.248*** -1.245*** 3.085*** 3.069*** 
 (3.34) (3.32) (-2.68) (-2.67) (4.30) (4.28) 
Leverage -0.450*** -0.431*** -0.245*** -0.256*** -0.205 -0.175 
 (-3.27) (-3.14) (-2.58) (-2.70) (-1.27) (-1.08) 
Advertising 
Intensity 
7.660*** 
(7.08) 
7.694*** 
(7.12) 
0.773 
(1.09) 
0.779 
(1.10) 
6.888*** 
(5.54) 
6.915*** 
(5.56) 
       
 
 
Constant -9.233*** -9.193*** -3.574*** -3.609*** -5.660*** -5.584*** 
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 (-44.16) (-44.27) (-24.41) (-24.59) (-24.24) (-24.05) 
Observations 9,506 9,506 9,506 9,506 9,506 9,506 
Adj. R2 0.487 0.487 0.426 0.426 0.237 0.238 
Industry Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES 
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C.5a: CSR Component – Community & Diversity  
This table presents the OLS regression results of the relationship between academic director and female academic director with firm net overall CSR score, CSR 
strengths and CSR concerns in the case of Community and Diversity components. All the dependent variables are measured in T+1 period while the independent 
variables are measured in T period. Thus, the sample size reduces from 12,484 to 9,506 director-year observations for these models. Academic Company Dummy is a 
dummy variable which equals 1 if the company has at least 1 academic director in its corporate board; otherwise it equals 0. Academic Director Ratio is the 
percentage of academic director appointed in the corporate board. Female Academic Director Dummy is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the director is both a 
female and an academic director; otherwise it equals 0. Female Academic Director Ratio is the percentage of female academic director appointed in the corporate 
board (total number of female academic director divided by total number of director in board). Democratic Academic Director is a dummy variable which equals 1 
if the academic director supports Democratic Party; otherwise it equals 0. Republican Academic Director is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the academic 
director supports Republican Party; otherwise it equals 0. Robust T-stats are in brackets and asterisks refer to significance levels: ***p<0.01, **<0.05 and *<0.10. 
Control variables in this table are same as Table 4. 
 
 Panel A Panel B 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
COM_ 
STR_N 
COM_ 
STR_N 
COM_ 
CON_N 
COM_ 
CON_N 
COM_ N COM_N 
DIV_ 
STR_N 
DIV_ 
STR_N 
DIV_ 
CON_N 
DIV_ 
CON_N 
DIV_ N DIV_N 
Academic 
Company Dummy 0.013 
(0.99) 
 
-0.020*** 
(-2.82) 
 
0.033** 
(2.28) 
 
0.039 
(1.56) 
 
-0.042*** 
(-3.05) 
 
0.081*** 
(2.70) 
 
Academic Director 
Ratio 
 0.103 
(1.30) 
 -0.092** 
(-2.09) 
 0.195** 
(2.21) 
 0.385** 
(2.43) 
 -0.326*** 
(-3.84) 
 0.711*** 
(3.69) 
Female Academic 
Director Dummy 
0.048* 
(1.82) 
 0.070*** 
(4.18) 
 -0.022 
(-0.72) 
 0.181*** 
(3.70) 
 -0.164*** 
(-8.31) 
 0.346*** 
(6.55) 
 
         
Female Academic 
Director Ratio 
 0.083 
(0.42) 
 0.374*** 
(3.10) 
 -0.291 
(-1.25) 
 1.405*** 
(3.58) 
 -1.314*** 
(-7.96) 
 2.719*** 
(6.21) 
Democratic 
0.279*** 0.292*** 0.006 0.005 0.273*** 0.287*** 0.209*** 0.218*** -0.020 -0.032 0.228*** 0.250*** 
(6.28) (6.66) (0.28) (0.23) (5.62) (6.02) (2.82) (2.97) (-0.70) (-1.17) (2.86) (3.16) 
Republican 0.092** 0.101** 0.041 0.038 0.051 0.063 0.116 0.133* 0.060* 0.041 0.056 0.092 
(2.00) (2.21) (1.59) (1.47) (1.02) (1.28) (1.56) (1.81) (1.80) (1.24) (0.69) (1.15) 
Observations 9,506 9,506 9,506 9,506 9,506 9,506 9,506 9,506 9,506 9,506 9,506 9,506 
Adj. R2 0.288 0.288 0.233 0.232 0.163 0.163 0.413 0.413 0.235 0.236 0.408 0.408 
Constant YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Control Variables YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
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C.5b: CSR Component – Employee Relations & Environment  
This table presents the OLS regression results of the relationship between academic director and female academic director with firm net overall CSR score, CSR 
strengths and CSR concerns in the case of Employee Relations and Environment components. All the dependent variables are measured in T+1 period while the 
independent variables are measured in T period. Thus, the sample size reduces from 12,484 to 9,506 director-year observations for these models. Academic 
Company Dummy is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the company has at least 1 academic director in its corporate board; otherwise it equals 0. Academic 
Director Ratio is the percentage of academic director appointed in the corporate board. Female Academic Director Dummy is a dummy variable which equals 1 if 
the director is both a female and an academic director; otherwise it equals 0. Female Academic Director Ratio is the percentage of female academic director 
appointed in the corporate board (total number of female academic director divided by total number of director in board). Democratic Academic Director is a 
dummy variable which equals 1 if the academic director supports Democratic Party; otherwise it equals 0. Republican Academic Director is a dummy variable 
which equals 1 if the academic director supports Republican Party; otherwise it equals 0. Robust T-stats are in brackets and asterisks refer to significance levels: 
***p<0.01, **<0.05 and *<0.10. Control variables in this table are same as Table 4. 
 
 Panel A Panel B 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
EMP_ 
STR_N 
EMP_ 
STR_N 
EMP_ 
CON_N 
EMP_ 
CON_N 
EMP_ N EMP_N 
ENV_ 
STR_N 
ENV_ 
STR_N 
ENV_ 
CON_N 
ENV_ 
CON_N 
ENV_ N ENV_N 
Academic 
Company Dummy 0.043*** 
(2.65) 
 
0.020 
(1.23) 
 
0.024 
(1.06) 
 
0.023 
(1.35) 
 
-0.037*** 
(-2.59) 
 
0.060*** 
(2.80) 
 
Academic Director 
Ratio  
0.273** 
(2.53) 
 -0.048 
(-0.50) 
 0.321** 
(2.29) 
 0.138 
(1.32) 
 -0.180** 
(-2.02) 
 0.318** 
(2.50) 
Female Academic 
Director Dummy 
0.052 
(1.63) 
 -0.056* 
(-1.91) 
 0.108** 
(2.49) 
 0.031 
(0.88) 
 0.120*** 
(3.51) 
 -0.089** 
(-2.06) 
 
Female Academic 
Director Ratio 
 0.424* 
(1.72) 
 -0.472** 
(-2.11) 
 0.896*** 
(2.67) 
 0.083 
(0.33) 
 0.818*** 
(3.23) 
 -0.735** 
(-2.22) 
Democratic 
-0.012 0.002 0.094** 0.108*** -0.106* -0.106* 0.102** 0.115** -0.003 -0.010 0.105* 0.126** 
(-0.29) (0.05) (2.22) (2.62) (-1.82) (-1.87) (2.03) (2.34) (-0.06) (-0.24) (1.76) (2.15) 
Republican 0.037 0.054 -0.067 -0.055 0.104 0.110 -0.074 -0.062 0.098* 0.090* -0.172** -0.152** 
(0.74) (1.12) (-1.47) (-1.23) (1.52) (1.63) (-1.45) (-1.25) (1.79) (1.65) (-2.38) (-2.14) 
Observations 9,506 9,506 9,506 9,506 9,506 9,506 9,506 9,506 9,506 9,506 9,506 9,506 
Adj. R2 0.252 0.252 0.255 0.255 0.126 0.126 0.386 0.386 0.453 0.453 0.242 0.242 
Constant YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Control Variables YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
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C.5c: CSR Component – Human Rights & Product  
This table presents the OLS regression results of the relationship between academic director and female academic director with firm net overall CSR score, CSR 
strengths and CSR concerns in the case of Human Rights and Product components. All the dependent variables are measured in T+1 period while the independent 
variables are measured in T period. Thus, the sample size reduces from 12,484 to 9,506 director-year observations for these models. Academic Company Dummy is a 
dummy variable which equals 1 if the company has at least 1 academic director in its corporate board; otherwise it equals 0. Academic Director Ratio is the 
percentage of academic director appointed in the corporate board. Female Academic Director Dummy is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the director is both a 
female and an academic director; otherwise it equals 0. Female Academic Director Ratio is the percentage of female academic director appointed in the corporate 
board (total number of female academic director divided by total number of director in board). Democratic Academic Director is a dummy variable which equals 1 
if the academic director supports Democratic Party; otherwise it equals 0. Republican Academic Director is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the academic 
director supports Republican Party; otherwise it equals 0. Robust T-stats are in brackets and asterisks refer to significance levels: ***p<0.01, **<0.05 and *<0.10. 
Control variables in this table are same as Table 4. 
 
 Panel A Panel B 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
HUM_ 
STR_N 
HUM_ 
STR_N 
HUM_ 
CON_N 
HUM_ 
CON_N 
HUM_ N HUM_N 
PRO_ 
STR_N 
PRO_ 
STR_N 
PRO_ 
CON_N 
PRO_ 
CON_N 
PRO_ N PRO_N 
Academic 
Company Dummy -0.001 
(-0.20) 
 
0.005 
(0.80) 
 
-0.006 
(-0.84) 
 
0.004 
(0.57) 
 
-0.027** 
(-2.03) 
 
0.031** 
(2.10) 
 
Academic Director 
Ratio  
0.029 
(1.54) 
 -0.046 
(-1.21) 
 0.075* 
(1.80) 
 0.103** 
(2.14) 
 -0.091 
(-1.07) 
 0.194** 
(2.00) 
Female Academic 
Director Dummy 
-0.004 
(-0.83) 
 0.011 
(0.82) 
 -0.016 
(-1.10) 
 0.053*** 
(3.22) 
 0.058** 
(2.09) 
 -0.005 
(-0.16) 
 
Female Academic 
Director Ratio 
 -0.089** 
(-2.46) 
 0.046 
(0.47) 
 -0.134 
(-1.33) 
 0.510*** 
(3.82) 
 0.520** 
(2.39) 
 -0.009 
(-0.04) 
Democratic 
0.001 0.001 0.034 0.041* -0.033 -0.040* -0.036* -0.041* 0.066* 0.052 -0.102** -0.093** 
(0.18) (0.16) (1.44) (1.73) (-1.38) (-1.69) (-1.67) (-1.92) (1.68) (1.37) (-2.22) (-2.07) 
Republican 0.010 0.009 0.027 0.033 -0.017 -0.024 -0.018 -0.018 -0.006 -0.017 -0.012 -0.001 
(0.94) (0.83) (1.10) (1.37) (-0.66) (-0.97) (-0.80) (-0.83) (-0.15) (-0.41) (-0.24) (-0.02) 
Observations 9,506 9,506 9,506 9,506 9,506 9,506 9,506 9,506 9,506 9,506 9,506 9,506 
Adj. R2 0.092 0.093 0.209 0.209 0.144 0.144 0.131 0.132 0.360 0.360 0.245 0.245 
Constant YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Control Variables YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
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C.5d: CSR Component – Corporate Governance 
This table presents the OLS regression results of the relationship between academic director and female academic director with firm net overall CSR score, CSR 
strengths and CSR concerns in the case of Corporate Governance components. All the dependent variables are measured in T+1 period while the independent 
variables are measured in T period. Thus, the sample size reduces from 12,484 to 9,506 director-year observations for these models. Academic Company Dummy is a 
dummy variable which equals 1 if the company has at least 1 academic director in its corporate board; otherwise it equals 0. Academic Director Ratio is the 
percentage of academic director appointed in the corporate board. Female Academic Director Dummy is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the director is both a 
female and an academic director; otherwise it equals 0. Female Academic Director Ratio is the percentage of female academic director appointed in the corporate 
board (total number of female academic director divided by total number of director in board). Democratic Academic Director is a dummy variable which equals 1 
if the academic director supports Democratic Party; otherwise it equals 0. Republican Academic Director is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the academic 
director supports Republican Party; otherwise it equals 0. Robust T-stats are in brackets and asterisks refer to significance levels: ***p<0.01, **<0.05 and *<0.10. 
Control variables in this table are same as Table 4. 
 
 Panel A 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
CGOV_ 
STR_N 
CGOV_ 
STR_N 
CGOV_ 
CON_N 
CGOV_ 
CON_N 
CGOV_ N CGOV_N 
Academic 
Company Dummy -0.017* 
(-1.90) 
 
-0.044*** 
(-3.13) 
 
0.027 
(1.53) 
 
Academic Director 
Ratio 
 0.038 
(0.66) 
 -0.346*** 
(-4.04) 
 0.384*** 
(3.49) 
Female Academic 
Director Dummy 
0.029 
(1.57) 
 -0.017 
(-0.68) 
 0.046 
(1.42) 
 
Female Academic 
Director Ratio 
 0.070 
(0.50) 
 0.001 
(0.00) 
 0.069 
(0.27) 
Democratic 
0.106*** 0.099*** 0.082** 0.067* 0.024 0.031 
(3.87) (3.63) (2.08) (1.74) (0.50) (0.68) 
Republican 0.023 0.014 0.057 0.042 -0.034 -0.029 
(0.87) (0.52) (1.47) (1.11) (-0.70) (-0.59) 
Observations 9,506 9,506 9,506 9,506 9,506 9,506 
Adj. R2 0.118 0.117 0.224 0.224 0.109 0.110 
Constant YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Control Variables YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES 
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C.6a: Academic Directors' Educational and Experience Effect – One by one 
This table presents the OLS regression results of the relationship between different categories of academic director 
and firm CSR strengths, CSR concerns and net overall CSR score. Dependent variables are measured in T+1 period 
while the independent variables are measured in T period. Thus, the sample size reduces from 12,484 to 9,506 
director-year observations for these models. Administrative Academic Director is a dummy variable which equals 1 
if the academic director is involved with an administrative role within academic institution; otherwise it equals 0. 
STEMM Academic Director is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the academic director has a background of 
science, technology, engineering, mathematics or medicine; otherwise it equals 0. Business Academic Director is a 
dummy variable which equals 1 if the academic director has a background of business or law; otherwise it equals 0. 
Industry Experienced Academic Director is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the academic director has 
significant industry experience in same industry that the appointed company runs its business; otherwise it equals 0. 
Research Academic Director is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the academic director is active in research align 
with appointed company’s core business model; otherwise it equals 0. Public Service Affiliated Academic Director 
is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the academic director is affiliated with any public service job; otherwise it 
equals 0. Robust T-stats are in brackets and asterisks refer to significance levels: ***p<0.01, **<0.05 and *<0.10. 
Control variables in this table are same as Table 4. 
 
 (1) (2) (3)  (1) (2) (3) 
 CSR_STR_N CSR_CON_N CSR_N  CSR_STR_N CSR_CON_N CSR_N 
Panel A    Panel D    
Administrative  
0.075*** 
(4.39) 
-0.041*** 
(-4.66) 
0.282*** 
(4.00) 
Industry 
Experienced  
0.060*** 
(3.68) 
-0.006 
(-0.66) 
0.437*** 
(5.86) 
Observations 9,506 9,506 9,506 Observations 9,506 9,506 9,506 
Adj. R2 0.277 0.229 0.236 Adj. R2 0.276 0.227 0.238 
Constant YES YES YES Constant YES YES YES 
Control Var. YES YES YES Control Var. YES YES YES 
Industry Dummy YES YES YES Industry Dummy YES YES YES 
Year Dummy YES YES YES Year Dummy YES YES YES 
Panel B    Panel E    
STEMM  
0.054*** 
(2.73) 
0.014 
(1.15) 
0.085 
(1.00) 
Research Focused  
0.008 
(0.43) 
0.001 
(0.08) 
0.105 
(1.23) 
Observations 9,506 9,506 9,506 Observations 9,506 9,506 9,506 
Adj. R2 0.275 0.228 0.235 Adj. R2 0.275 0.227 0.235 
Constant YES YES YES Constant YES YES YES 
Control Var. YES YES YES Control Var. YES YES YES 
Industry Dummy YES YES YES Industry Dummy YES YES YES 
Year Dummy YES YES YES Year Dummy YES YES YES 
Panel C    Panel F    
Business  
0.011 
(0.70) 
-0.045*** 
(-5.57) 
0.283*** 
(4.08) 
Public Service 
Affiliated  
0.140*** 
(4.71) 
0.079*** 
(4.50) 
0.269** 
(2.05) 
Observations 9,506 9,506 9,506 Observations 9,506 9,506 9,506 
Adj. R2 0.275 0.230 0.236 Adj. R2 0.278 0.230 0.235 
Constant YES YES YES Constant YES YES YES 
Control Var. YES YES YES Control Var. YES YES YES 
Industry Dummy YES YES YES Industry Dummy YES YES YES 
Year Dummy YES YES YES Year Dummy YES YES YES 
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C.6b: Academic Directors' Educational and Experience Effect – All together   
This table presents the OLS regression results of the relationship between different categories of academic director and firm CSR 
strengths, CSR concerns and net overall CSR score. Dependent variables are measured in T+1 period while the independent 
variables are measured in T period. Thus, the sample size reduces from 12,484 to 9,506 director-year observations for these 
models. Administrative Academic Director is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the academic director is involved with an 
administrative role within academic institution; otherwise it equals 0. STEMM Academic Director is a dummy variable which 
equals 1 if the academic director has a background of science, technology, engineering, mathematics or medicine; otherwise it 
equals 0. Business Academic Director is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the academic director has a background of business or 
law; otherwise it equals 0. Industry Experienced Academic Director is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the academic director 
has significant industry experience in same industry that the appointed company runs its business; otherwise it equals 0. Research 
Academic Director is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the academic director is active in research align with appointed 
company’s core business model; otherwise it equals 0. Public Service Affiliated Academic Director is a dummy variable which 
equals 1 if the academic director is affiliated with any public service job; otherwise it equals 0. Robust T-stats are in brackets and 
asterisks refer to significance levels: ***p<0.01, **<0.05 and *<0.10. Control variables in this table are same as Table 4. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 CSR_STR_N CSR_CON_N CSR_N CSR_STR_N CSR_CON_N CSR_N 
Administrative  
0.056*** 
(2.92) 
-0.047*** 
(-4.47) 
0.172** 
(2.04) 
0.047*** 
(2.63) 
-0.059*** 
(-6.03) 
0.180** 
(2.30) 
STEMM  
 
0.027 
(1.05) 
0.014 
(0.82) 
0.059 
(0.53) 
0.029 
(1.26) 
0.032** 
(2.15) 
-0.107 
(-1.08) 
Business  -0.009 
(-0.52) 
-0.031*** 
(-3.06) 
0.220*** 
(2.61) 
   
Industry 
Experienced  
   
0.023 
(1.32) 
-0.007 
(-0.75) 
0.383*** 
(4.75) 
Research 
Focused  
-0.003 
(-0.13) 
0.003 
(0.20) 
0.025 
(0.25) 
-0.005 
(-0.25) 
-0.011 
(-0.85) 
0.155* 
(1.65) 
Public Service 
Affiliated  
 
0.119*** 
(4.03) 
0.097*** 
(5.41) 
0.182 
(1.38) 
0.113*** 
(3.70) 
0.099*** 
(5.54) 
0.081 
(0.60) 
Observations 9,506 9,506 9,506 9,506 9,506 9,506 
Adj. R2 0.279 0.235 0.237 0.279 0.234 0.239 
Constant YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Control Var. YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry 
Dummy 
YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 
 
